I. INTRODUCTION

I
nternational tax policy discussions frequently illuminate important policy tradeoffs. Tax revenue needs are balanced against concerns regarding effi cient capital allocation and the competitiveness of home country multinational fi rms. For example, since U.S. based multinational fi rms are taxed on their foreign income, there is a concern that they will be tax disadvantaged relative to multinational fi rms based in countries that exempt foreign income. There is also a concern that high U.S. corporate tax rates and our worldwide tax system may result in multinational fi rms resorting to corporate inversions in order to reduce their worldwide tax burden. 1 These concerns have lead some to advocate that the United States adopt an exemption system of international taxation. Still, it is likely that moving to an exemption system would exacerbate the already large incentive for multinational fi rms to shift profi ts away from the United States through tax-motivated transfer pricing and other techniques. Since income shifting is already a substantial source of revenue loss for the United States government, there is an important policy tradeoff in a move to an exemption system of taxation.
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What is often lost in these discussions is the nature of multinational fi rms themselves, their importance to the domestic economy, and the resulting policy considerations. This paper sets an agenda for more careful consideration of several important questions. First, what does it mean to have a multinational fi rm "headquartered" in a particular economy? Second, should residents care about whether a multinational fi rm is headquartered in their domestic economy? Aside from issues of pride, what are the economic rationales for using tax policy to infl uence multinational fi rms' headquarters decisions? Third, what does the prior literature suggest about the determinants of fi rm headquarters, and how sensitive are headquarters locations to tax policy parameters? Fourth, what can we learn about this question by examining the behavior of the world's largest 500 corporations over the past twenty years? Finally, how does the pattern of headquarters across countries compare to the pattern of indicators of scientifi c progress?
While the current paper is merely suggestive of future research questions, it does point to some preliminary observations. Multinational fi rm headquarters are a complex and international concept, as fi rms may increasingly choose to locate their fi nancial, tax, and operational headquarters across national boundaries. Attracting and retaining multinational fi rm headquarters may be an important policy goal, if multinational fi rm headquarters generate important external effects that are diffi cult to target directly. The prior literature suggests that multinational fi rms are sensitive to tax considerations in their headquarters location decisions, although trends in Fortune 500 global fi rms make it diffi cult to discern substantial tax infl uences over prior decades, and indicators of scientifi c progress are not systematically related to tax policy variables.
In addition to suggesting an agenda for future research, these observations shed light on ideal international tax policy design. International tax systems should acknowledge the globally integrated nature of the world economy, and they should be designed to reduce the importance of arbitrary fi nancial and organizational decisions of multinational fi rms.
II. WHAT IS A MULTINATIONAL FIRM HEADQUARTERS?
In a global economy, the location of a multinational fi rm's headquarters may be diffi cult to classify. Many defi ne headquarters location based on fi nancial reporting information. These locations are typically the place where the fi rm's stock is traded. For example, under U.S. federal securities laws, publicly traded fi rms must fi le specifi c fi nancial reports on a regular basis, conforming to the requirements of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.
One could also consider a fi rm's legal residence for tax purposes as the measure of headquarters. The United States determines domicile as the legal residence or place of incorporation, but other countries defi ne domicile differently; e.g., the United Kingdom defi nes domicile as the location of operational headquarters. The latter defi nition raises its own questions of interpretation. For example, how should one classify a fi rm when the location of operational headquarters is spread across national boundaries?
Consider the following possible defi nitions of fi rm headquarters, which raise associated questions. As is immediately apparent, for most multinational fi rms, there is unlikely to be a single answer to all of the above questions. In part, this ambiguity is due to the very nature of multinational fi rms, as such fi rms have found it optimal to spread operations across national boundaries. Yet even beyond traditional divisions of activities among countries, the location of the headquarters themselves has become increasingly scattered in recent years. Desai (2009) describes several specifi c examples of fi rms that have chosen to separate their headquarters functions across multiple countries. For example, Genpact originated as a subsidiary of General Electric in 1997. In 2005, it become an independent company. In 2007, Genpact was listed as a publicly traded fi rm with a listing on the NYSE (so it is subject to U.S. SEC fi ling requirements). Yet most of its managerial functions are in India, and it has a corporate headquarters of Bermuda. It operates in 13 countries with 38,600 employees and $1.1 billion in revenue.
3 Is it a U.S., Indian, or Bermudan headquartered fi rm?
Indeed, it may be profi table for a fi rm to split headquarters functions across countries. Even though coordination costs may increase, there may be large offsetting benefi ts. Listing on a stock exchange with good investor protections may lower the perceived risk associated with shares, thus reducing fi nancing costs. Choice of fi nancial location may also affect the size and composition of the investor base, especially when institutional investors are limited in their foreign holdings. As discussed in Desai (2009) , some fi rms are cross-listed, with more than one fi nancial identity.
Further, countries may have natural comparative advantages in different types of managerial expertise, so a fi rm may fi nd it optimal to locate marketing near customers, fi nance near fi nancial markets, and IT near areas of computing expertise. Also, low-tax countries, such as Bermuda, may be particularly attractive locations in which to reside for tax purposes. For example, Dischinger and Riedel (2008) provide convincing evidence that multinational fi rms are adept at locating intangible assets, and the associated income, in low-tax locations.
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III. WHAT ARE THE CONSEQUENCES OF HEADQUARTERS LOCATION?
A. Possible Benefi cial Eff ects
The above discussion reveals a great deal of ambiguity regarding what it means to have a multinational fi rm headquarters in a particular country. Even beyond that ambiguity, there remains a crucial question concerning whether multinational fi rm headquarters are per se desirable. Several arguments support such a position.
First, and easiest for an economist (but not a politician) to dismiss, are issues of nationalism and pride. When large and well-known multinational fi rms are headquartered in the home country, it may simply generate pride in the ability of the country's fi rms to compete in the world economy. Of course, this simplistic argument begs a number of other questions. Why? What is special about having multinational fi rm headquarters that would instill the pride in the fi rst place? We are left needing a deeper explanation.
Second, perhaps it is the very activities of the multinational fi rm headquarters themselves that are desirable. Job creation stimulates economic activity; investment builds the capital stock, enabling future productivity and growth. Of course, most economists would argue that the level of employment and the amount of investment are fundamentally macroeconomic phenomena. The overall levels of these aggregates are thus more likely to be infl uenced by macroeconomic variables: the stance of monetary and fi scal policy, interest rates, exchange rates, savings rates, and the overall state of aggregate demand relative to aggregate supply.
Still, one can argue that multinational fi rm headquarters are important not so much for infl uencing the level of jobs or investment, but for infl uencing the type of jobs or investment. In particular, the sorts of activities that multinational fi rm headquarters undertake may be particularly special. First, multinational fi rm headquarters are more likely to generate learning and innovation, since research, development, and entrepreneurial activities are headquarters activities. Second, multinational fi rms may be more likely to generate excess profi ts due to their size, market power, and fi rm-specifi c knowledge.
Finally, headquarters are more likely to be the locations of high wage jobs. In fact, a large literature suggests that wages may exceed the marginal product of labor due to effi ciency wages or the presence of labor rents. Economic rents are often shared with workers, as evidence regarding interindustry wage differentials has persistently shown. For example, Budd, Konings, and Slaughter (2005) cite many such studies, and they extend this literature to consider how economic rents may be shared across affi liates in multinational fi rms.
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All three of these arguments are particularly persuasive if the special nature of multinational headquarters activities spills over to the economy at large and are not appropriated solely by the fi rm, its shareholders, and its workers. For example, if research and development generates learning that benefi ts other fi rms and that increases economywide productivity, then there are external benefi ts that could justify policy attention.
Similarly, if excess profi ts or rents affect the economy more widely through enhanced government revenues, increased funds for innovation, or other spillovers, they may be socially desirable. Although economic theory generally suggests that competitive outcomes are more effi cient than those that involve monopolistic distortion, it may still be desirable to ensure that excess profi ts are earned domestically. Also, some literature suggests that fi rms with market power are more likely to innovate.
Dischinger and Riedel (2009) provide evidence regarding the nature of multinational fi rm headquarters, using a large fi rm-level dataset (Amadeus data) of European fi rms to study the profi tability of headquarters fi rms relative to their subsidiaries. They fi nd that headquarters fi rms are more profi table, although the gap between headquarters and subsidiary profi tability is diminishing over time. They attribute the gap to the higher agency costs and lower competitiveness of subsidiaries, whereas headquarters fi rms may know the local market better. The gap is about 30 percent and is robust to the inclusion of a large number of controls. This suggests that multinational headquarters will generate larger profi ts, higher wages and labor rents, and greater tax payments.
Thus, from the perspective of government policy, assuming a goal of maximum national welfare, it remains unclear whether to target multinational fi rm headquarters with policy measures. National pride may provide one rationale, but it is an economically weak one. Economic activity as a whole is likely determined by macroeconomic factors. Also, to the extent that headquarters generate useful economic spillovers, it may be most effi cient to encourage those spillover-generating activities directly. As Bhagwati (1971) long ago established, it is more effi cient to attack distortions directly in economic policy making. If research and development are the desiderata, for example, it is better to subsidize them directly than to subsidize entities that may or may not undertake disproportionate amounts of research and development. Targeting policy goals directly is more effi cient, since targeting policy goals indirectly generates unwelcome consequences. For example, subsidizing headquarters may provide excess encouragement to headquarters activities that do not involve positive spillovers to the broader economy as well as those activities that do.
B. Government Revenue
Governments have the additional concern of corporate tax revenue. Revenues are determined by the location where multinational fi rms book their profi ts, and there is substantial evidence that fi rms are tax sensitive in their decisions regarding where income is reported; see de Mooij (2005) for an overview. In addition to the country's corporate tax rate, the nature of the country's tax system will affect the taxation of multinational fi rms. Some countries use an exemption system, exempting the foreign income of their resident fi rms. Others, such as the United States, employ a worldwide tax system (also called a credit system), taxing foreign income once it is repatriated and offering a tax credit for taxes paid to foreign governments. Many countries also operate hybrid systems that exempt some types of income, but that also tax other types of foreign income.
These considerations indicate that policy makers may have competing aims when they consider tax policy toward multinational fi rms. Encouraging multinational fi rm headquarters activities domestically may suggest that policy makers should tax the income of multinational fi rms lightly. These arguments may hold particular sway in a second best environment where it is not possible to "attack the distortion directly." Indeed, U.S. based multinational fi rms have repeatedly recommended lower U.S. corporate tax rates, and many have suggested moving to a system that exempts the foreign income of U.S. based fi rms. These arguments are often premised on the desirability of multinational fi rm headquarters activities. Yet revenue considerations may provide an important and possibly competing consideration. For instance, there is some evidence that exemption countries raise less revenue from the corporate tax than worldwide tax system countries, although there remain questions regarding the revenue-maximizing corporate tax rate. 6 Finally, there is a strong argument for separating decisions regarding the optimal taxation of multinational fi rm income from the legal and fi nancial arrangements of multinational fi rms. Ideally, taxation of multinational fi rm income should be based as closely as possible on where the income is earned, rather than basing tax liabilities on tax-motivated decisions concerning fi nance, legal and organizational form, or accounting. Indeed, there is a vast body of empirical research on taxation that suggests a hierarchy of behavioral responses.
7 Taxpayers are most responsive when the timing of transactions affects taxation, and are also responsive in undertaking fi nancial or accounting responses to taxation; real economic decisions are far less responsive to taxation.
In this context, I have previously argued that formulary apportionment would provide a better approximation than our present system (Avi-Yonah and Clausing, 2008) . While formulary apportionment would have its own fl aws, there is ample evidence that our current system of multinational taxation does not provide even a rough approximation of where income is earned. As just one simple example, if one considers the top 10 profi t locations for U.S. multinational fi rms in 2005, based on the share of worldwide (non-U.S.) profi ts earned in each location, eight of the top 10 profi t countries are locations with effective tax rates of less than 10 percent. 8 Also, at present, a multinational fi rm's tax burden is unduly affected by its legal and organizational form. For example, in the United States, deferral of taxation on foreign income is allowed for subsidiary fi rms but not for branch fi rms. Also, the location of corporate headquarters for tax purposes can have large effects on tax liabilities. For example, Seida and Wempe (2004) demonstrate that multinational fi rms face much lower effective tax burdens after corporate inversions, a fi nding that they attribute to earnings stripping.
IV. PRIOR LITERATURE ON MULTINATIONAL FIRM HEADQUARTERS
Much of the prior work on multinational fi rm headquarters decisions has focused on the effects of taxation. However, work from the fi eld of Economic Geography also provides a useful starting point. Krugman (1991) develops a seminal model, where the pattern of economic activity and industrial clusters depends on the interaction of economies of scale, transportation costs, and the share of manufacturing in expenditure relative to agriculture.
Models such as Baldwin and Krugman (2004) and Haufl er and Wooten (1999) have emphasized that agglomeration effects may help insulate core nations from the effects of tax competition, allowing them to set higher tax rates without losing capital. This suggests that country size may have an interactive effect with tax rates, such that high tax rates are more likely to deter multinational fi rms in small countries. Baldwin and Okubo (2009) also model how tax motives for fi rm relocation are affected by fi rm size. They fi nd that large fi rms are more likely to relocate in reaction to high taxes.
There has been some empirical work on multinational fi rm headquarters decisions. Becker, Egger, and Merlo (2009) focus on multinational fi rms with German headquarters. They use data on more than 11,000 German municipalities to examine the tax sensitivity of multinational companies with headquarters in Germany. They fi nd that headquarters are substantially responsive to municipal level taxation.
Three recent papers employ large scale fi rm-level data: Barrios et al. (2009 ), Huizinga and Voget (2009 . Barrios et al. use data from the Amadeus database for European fi rms over the period [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] . They analyze how home and host country taxation as well as withholding taxes affect the location of new foreign subsidiaries. They fi nd a large infl uence of both host and home country taxation, but no evidence of withholding tax effects. A similar paper by Huizinga and Voget (2009) fi nds that the structure of parent-subsidiary organization following mergers and acquisitions is infl uenced by the tax rates and tax systems of the two countries in question; fi rms systematically choose arrangements that reduce their worldwide tax liabilities, avoiding headquartering fi rms in countries with high international tax burdens. Voget (2009) analyzes data on fi rms from the Orbis and Zephyr databases over the period 1997-2007, studying in particular the subset of multinational fi rms that have relocated their headquarters. Both controlled foreign corporation (CFC) legislation (such as subpart F) and increased repatriation tax rates are found to increase the likelihood of multinational fi rm relocation. Dischinger and Riedel (2010) also consider the role of headquarters in profi t shifting behavior. Using the Amadeus dataset for European multinational fi rms for 1995-2007, they fi nd that profi t shifting is more likely to go towards headquarters fi rms, controlling for tax differences among countries. They hypothesize that this is due to agency issues that generate an incentive to keep profi ts in the headquarters location. For a given tax rate difference, income shifting is about 50 percent smaller if the headquarters country is the high-tax country. Thus, governments may attempt to target multinational fi rm headquarters in order to protect their tax base, as income shifting favors headquarters destinations.
V. THE WORLD'S LARGEST FIRMS
To examine the location of headquarters, I begin with data from Fortune magazine on the world's largest 500 fi rms.
10 Fortune ranks fi rms based on revenues (in dollars, or converted into dollars from local currency). Comparable lists are available from 1990-2008. Companies are classifi ed with respect to a home country based on fi nancial reporting; for U.S. fi rms, companies that produce a 10-K are included. In some cases, fi rms are explicitly noted to have an ambiguous headquarters. For example, the world's 9 Much of the prior work on the effects of tax rates and (exemption and worldwide) tax systems has focused on foreign direct investment rather than headquarters. de Mooij and Ederveen (2003) perform a meta-analysis of 25 studies of foreign direct investment tax elasticities over the period 1984 to 2001. They fi nd that the median value of the tax rate semi-elasticity is 3.3, indicating that a one percentage point reduction in the host country tax rate raises foreign direct investment by 3.3 percent. They also note that the elasticities of the reviewed studies increase over time. Their analysis indicates that elasticities in studies where foreign direct investment fl ows originate in exemption countries are no larger than those in studies where the investment originates in credit countries. This result is limited to the subset of the analysis that removes extreme observations. 10 An alternative list is provided by Forbes, which ranks the top-2000 fi rms worldwide. Trends are similar if one considers a measure that accounts for the size of fi rms, such as the total sales of top-500 fi rms. Figure 2 shows the countries that have more than two percent of the total top-500 fi rm sales in 2008. The pattern of changes for the United States, Japan, and China is consistent with the count data. Figure 3 shows sales in constant 2000 dollars. This fi gure reveals a general upward trend in the importance of top-500 fi rms, but the relative trends among countries remain similar.
In general, no particularly surprising patterns emerge from this analysis. However, from a tax policy perspective, it may be informative to investigate whether changes in the locations of Fortune 500 fi rms are related to changes in tax rates or tax systems. Figure 4 shows the share of fi rms that are headquartered in countries that use a credit (or worldwide) system to tax their resident multinational fi rms. This fi gure assumes that fi rms headquarters for tax purposes are the same as their fi nancial reporting headquarters, as listed by Fortune. While that assumption generally holds, it may not be true in all cases, as discussed above. During this period, there is a decrease in the share of Fortune 500 fi rms that are headquartered in credit countries, from approximately 70 percent in 1990 to about 65 percent in 2007. Of course, these percentages may change dramatically in subsequent years, as Japan and the UK adopt changes in their tax systems.
In Tables 2 and 3 , a very simple regression analysis is used to consider the impact of tax and economic variables on the location of Fortune 500 fi rm headquarters across countries over the time period 1990-2007. The sample consists of approximately 70 countries for which corporate tax rate data are available, although many countries do not report any Fortune 500 fi rms. In addition to considering the count of such fi rms (column 1), the analysis also considers the total profi ts of top 500 fi rms in column 2, the total sales revenues of top 500 fi rms (column 3), the assets of these fi rms (column 4), and employment (column 5). Fortune reports ranks and revenues in all years, but only reports assets and employment prior to 2003. Profi ts are reported in all years aside from 2003 and 2004.
In Table 2 , baseline specifi cations consider the effect of economic size (captured by real GDP), economic development (captured by real GDP per-capita), and the corporate tax rate. Most variables are in natural log form. GDP and GDP per-capita have their expected effect. An economy one percent larger is associated with 0.4 percent more Fortune 500 fi rms, and between 1.3 and 2.0 percent more economic activity (profi ts, sales, assets, and employment) within those fi rms. GDP per-capita also has a positive and statistically signifi cant impact on Fortune 500 activity. The tax rate has a surprisingly positive effect. This result is robust to the exclusion of the United States.
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Interestingly, if an interaction term is included between the tax rate and country size (measured by GDP), the tax coeffi cient becomes statistically signifi cantly negative, while the interaction term is positive, providing some support for the theoretical insights of Baldwin and Krugman (2004) and Haufl er and Wooten (1999) . High tax rates may discourage multinational headquarters for small countries, but not for large ones. In the 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 80.0% 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 Credit Non Credit
Figure 4
Share of Top 500 Firms, by Tax System specifi cation describing the count of top fi rms, the negative tax rate effect is dominant for the economically smallest 20 percent of the countries in the sample. Results for the column 1 specifi cation with this interaction term are included in column 6.
13 Table 3 includes more tax measures: (1) dummy variables indicate whether the country has an exemption or hybrid system of taxing its resident multinational fi rms, distinguishing such countries from worldwide/credit countries and (2) a dummy variable indicates if the country has a CFC law. It is a common perception that multinational fi rms will, ceteris paribus, prefer to be headquartered in countries that exempt foreign income as well as those countries without CFC laws. Thus, exempt and hybrid are hypothesized to have positive coeffi cients, while CFC law is hypothesized to have a negative coeffi cient. This table also controls for the geographic remoteness of countries and year-specifi c fi xed effects. 13 For other dependent variables, results are similar. Tax rate coeffi cients are negative and interaction term coeffi cients (for the variable tax rate * lngdp) are positive. The combined results imply negative tax rate effects for the smallest 0-20 percent of the countries in the sample, depending on the specifi cation. Full results are available upon request. In Table 3 , the anomalous tax rate result disappears; the effect of the tax rate becomes statistically insignifi cant. The change is caused by the inclusion of fewer observations due to the limited country coverage of the additional variables; Table 3 is limited to mostly Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries.
(If the same specifi cation is run without the additional variables, but with the reduced sample, the tax coeffi cients remain statistically insignifi cant.) Thus, there appears to be no statistically discernible effect of the tax rate on Fortune 500 fi rm locations amongst OECD countries.
Further, most other tax variables do not have a large impact on the presence of Fortune 500 fi rms. The tax system seldom matters, nor does the existence of CFC laws. The one statistically discernible infl uence of tax considerations is the positive correlation between a hybrid tax system and the sales or assets of Fortune 500 fi rms headquartered in a particular country, relative to the omitted group (credit system countries). Yet even these infl uences of the hybrid variable disappear if country fi xed effects are utilized.
14 Thus, while this analysis is quite limited in scope, the evidence indicates that the size and wealth of an economy are the primary determinants of multinational fi rm headquarters. To the extent that tax rates and tax systems matter, their infl uence is too subtle to be distinguished in this simple analysis.
Given the nature of these data, I also used zero-infl ated Poisson specifi cations for Tables 2 and 3 . Since the data include many country/year observations with zero top-500 fi rms, this method may be appropriate for the data. 15 The use of this method does not substantially affect the main conclusions, although all of the tax variables in Table  2 become statistically insignifi cant, instead of anomalously positive. In Table 3 , the two positive coeffi cients for hybrid become statistically indistinguishable from zero, although the exempt variable takes on a statistically signifi cant positive coeffi cient in the fi rst column.
16
VI. EVIDENCE FROM OECD DATA ON SCIENTIFIC ACTIVITIES
As discussed above, the argument that headquarters activities are economically desirable is closely linked to the possibility that these activities generate benefi cial external effects that are not entirely appropriated by the market participants themselves. In this context, research and development may be a particularly valuable activity to have in the domestic economy. The OECD collects several data series that measure scientifi c activities in member countries, over the period 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 France Germany Japan U.K. U.S. China
Figure 6
Business R&D Spending in Constant 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 U.S. Japan U.K. France Germany Other EU Other In Figure 7 , the data are considered based on the tax system of the host country, separating exemption (together with hybrid) from worldwide systems. The data are scaled by country GDP (in constant dollars) since larger economies are likely to generate more patent activity. In panel (A), the solid line shows patents per trillion dollars of GDP for non-credit (both exemption and hybrid) countries, and the dashed line shows the same measure for credit countries. While non-credit countries have more patents relative to GDP than credit countries, the difference between the two groups narrows over time, particularly in recent years. Panel (B) shows business sector research and development expenditure, scaled by GDP. Here credit and non-credit countries appear similar, overall. Table 4 reports regressions similar to those of Table 3 , using the OECD science measures data. Typically, both tax rates and CFC laws have no effect on most measures of scientifi c activities. Tax systems have unclear effects. In columns 1 and 2, countries with exemption or hybrid tax systems appear to have more patents. Larger and richer economies also generate more patents, as do countries where businesses invest more in research in development (included as an explanatory variable in column 2). In column 3, the dependent variable is the share of total OECD patents originating in a particular country; in this case, exemption and hybrid countries have a lower patent share. This regression was also considered without the inclusion of the United States; the exemption dummy loses its statistical signifi cance in that case. The United States has 32 percent of OECD patents in 2006; the average (non-U.S.) OECD country has 2.3 percent of OECD patents.
In columns 4 and 5, business R&D expenditure and business R&D employment show no relation to either tax rates or tax systems. Column 6 considers an OECD data series that measures technology products balance of payments, as technology related receipts minus technology related payments. The negative coeffi cient on the hybrid tax system may refl ect the importance of the United States, which is an outlier. If the United States is omitted from the analysis, the tax system coeffi cient loses statistical signifi cance, although the tax rate is still positively associated with technology balance of payments. In 2006, the U.S. technology balance of payments was about $40 billion; for the typical OECD country, the technology balance of payments averaged about $1.5 billion. 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Credit Countries Non-Credit Countries Panel B: Business Sector R&D Expenditure per thousand dollars GDP
Figure 7
Panel A: OECD Science Indicators, by Tax System Patents per trillion dollars GDP, 1990 GDP, -2006 
VII. CONCLUSION
The simple empirical investigation in this paper does not suggest a strong relationship between tax policy variables and the location of Fortune 500 fi rms over the period 1990-2008. Likewise, while patents are positively associated with exemption or hybrid tax system countries, two other science measures are negatively associated with exemption or hybrid system countries, implying no clear relationship between scientifi c prowess and tax system variables for OECD countries over the period 1985-2005. Still, a small recent body of research sheds more light on these questions. Particularly noteworthy are the papers by Barrios et al. (2009) , Huizinga and Voget (2009) 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005. (2009), and Riedel (2009, 2010) . Using very comprehensive data and a careful empirical approach, these authors identify the importance of tax incentives in multinational fi rm headquarters decisions. If multinational fi rm headquarters are tax sensitive, tax policy should also consider whether and why multinational fi rm headquarters are desirable. The above discussion has illustrated a few helpful principles. First, multinational fi rm headquarters are an inherently ambiguous concept. Multinational fi rms are by their very essence international entities, and it is to be expected that they will likewise organize their headquarters activities across national boundaries. Second, multinational fi rms may generate positive external effects on the economy through activities that are associated with innovation, higher profi ts, and higher wages. Yet the theory of distortions and welfare, carefully explicated by Bhagwati (1971) , has essential relevance. When possible, it is ideal to target policy goals as directly as possible, and it is unlikely that encouraging multinational fi rm headquarters per se is the most effi cient way to encourage their associated positive external effects.
Finally, there is a strong argument for separating decisions regarding the optimal taxation of multinational fi rm income from the legal and fi nancial arrangements of multinational fi rms. This argument grows stronger with the increasing fl exibility of multinational fi rms in the global economy. Ideally, taxation of multinational fi rm income should be based as closely as possible on where the income is earned, and not on tax-motivated decisions concerning fi nance, legal and organizational form, or accounting. A vast body of empirical research on taxation suggests a hierarchy of behavioral responses; taxpayers are more responsive in undertaking fi nancial or accounting responses to taxation than in their real economic decisions. In this context, international tax reform should focus on designing a system that more clearly and simply approximates the true location of multinational fi rm income-generating activities.
